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# The History Of Intelligence

**SECRET INTELLIGENCE AGENT.** By H. Montgomery Hyde. St. Martin's. 281 pp. \$11.95

**THE SHADOW WARRIORS: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A.** By Bradley F. Smith. Basic. 507 pp. \$20.75

By THOMAS F. TROY

WHEN YOU HAVE written books about everybody else, you might as well write about yourself. That is H. Montgomery Hyde's situation. He has written at least a score of biographies, including one of his old chief, Sir William S. Stephenson, the near legendary "man called Intrepid," who ran British intelligence in the United States from 1940 to 1945. Hyde has also written about one of Stephenson's more romanticized agents, "Cynthia," who found sexual promiscuity a handy cover for stealing Italian and French ciphers in Washington. Now Hyde has written of his own wartime service with Stephenson in Bermuda, New York, and Latin America in *Secret Intelligence Agent*.

Not the most informative of Hyde's books, this thin, anecdotal volume contains two important offerings. One is a detailed revelation of the successful American reining in in March 1942 of the free-wheeling British intelligence service in this country.

Of course, the Englishman Hyde does not cast the event in quite those terms, but he is an able and honest, as well as prolific, writer, and his text requires only slight altering to bring it into line with that American perspective.

What he narrates is the confrontation in which top American officials, prodded by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover, told the British ambassador that President Roosevelt and his Cabinet were "unhappy" with such illegal British shenanigans ("activities" in Hyde's language) as tapping wires and shanghaiing sailors and that they wanted British activity in America restricted to liaison.

So it was agreed to limit the British to liaison, but, as Hyde candidly admits, British "covert activities continued as before, though more discreetly . . ." Even so, for Berle and Hoover, who had long complained of Stephenson's organization, it was vindication. It was also a conscious enunciation, probably the first in American history, of a cardinal principle of any sensible national intelligence policy, namely, that no foreign intelligence service, however friendly and nobly motivated, will be allowed to operate illegally in this country.

The other important element of Hyde's memoir is the appendix, written not by the author but by Sir William himself, alive and alert in Bermuda. Actually, it was dictated by him in about 1960. The substance of it—The British role in creating OSS—has already been embodied in Hyde's Stephenson biography, *Room 3603*, in William Stevenson's *A Man Called Intrepid*, and in this reviewer's *Donovan and the CIA*. Now it is published in its entirety for the first time. As such, it is an important contribution to intelligence history. More pertinently, it is helpful in demonstrating a fundamental factual error in the central thesis of *The Shadow Warriors* by Bradley F. Smith.

Smith, who teaches history at Cabrillo College in California, has produced a substantial, provocative, and readable contribution to the growing literature on OSS. His book is a coherent and comprehensive narrative of the American institutionalization of what he calls "shadow warfare," i.e. such irregular warfare as sabotage, guerrilla attacks, and secret intelligence. He has written, in particular, an organizational history of the rise, development, and activities of William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan's Coordinator of Information (COI) and

its successor, the Office of Strategic Services, and he relates their history to the establishment in 1947 of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Lest the reader think that "organizational history" implies dullness, let him be disabused. Smith writes well, forcefully, albeit too glibly at times. More importantly, he has spiced up his narrative with a provocative central thesis which sets him at odds, as he sees it, with all others who have written about OSS.

Smith maintains that "Donovan enthusiasts," among whom he fairly includes this reviewer, are simply wrong in holding "the view that the C.O.I.-O.S.S.-C.I.A. evolution can be understood best as the development of a clearly delineated Donovan plan that attained supreme fulfillment in the C.I.A. charter." In other words, what Congress established in 1947 was not what Donovan had in mind in 1941, says Smith.

He maintains instead that Donovan's COI was originally conceived as only "a propaganda and information coordinating agency," that OSS went through—thanks to Donovan's personality and wartime exigencies—numerous functional twists and turns, and that OSS publicists, lamenting Truman's abolition of OSS in 1945, but glorying in exaggerated ideas of their accomplish-

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